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Raising Revenues for Charity: Auctions versus Lotteries 
Abstract:  We report an experiment conducted to gain insight into factors that may affect 
revenues in English auctions and lotteries, two commonly used charity fund-raising 
formats.  In particular, we examine how changes in the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) from the public component of bidding, and how changes in the distribution of 
values affect the revenue properties of each format.  Although we observe some predicted 
comparative static effects, the dominant result is that lottery revenues uniformly exceed 
English auction revenues.  The similarity of lottery and English auction bids across sales 
formats appears to drive the excess lottery revenues.   
 
  2 1. Introduction 
Auctions and lotteries are standard means of raising funds for local public goods.   
Members of schools, churches, local sports clubs and community arts groups gather with 
frequency at fund-raising dinners and receptions to recognize their common interest in the 
charitable cause and the generosity (and in some cases the luck) of their fellows, some of whom 
win or purchase items that they value highly. 
Beyond the utility of participating in such events, charity lotteries and auctions can also 
raise money effectively, and that aspect is the focus of this paper.  Morgan (2000) analyzes the 
use of a lottery as a fund raising mechanism.  Assuming homogeneous individual valuations for 
the prize, Morgan shows that when lottery ticket purchases reflect a combination of private 
values for the raffled item and some return from contributing to a charitable organization, a 
lottery may generate substantially higher revenues than would fund raising efforts through 
standard voluntary contributions.  Intuitively, the chance of winning the raffled item mitigates 
the free-rider incentives that undermine fund raising through private voluntary contributions.  
Using experimental methods Morgan and Sefton (2000) generate empirical support for this 
prediction.  Holding constant the rate of return that participants derive from public contributions 
(the MPCR), Morgan and Sefton observe markedly higher contributions in charity lotteries than 
in comparable voluntary contributions games, a difference that increases as participants become 
experienced with the mechanisms.  
This paper extends the analysis of Morgan (2000) and Morgan and Sefton (2000) in two 
dimensions pertinent to many naturally occurring charity fund raising events.  First, we allow for 
prize value heterogeneities.  Significant value heterogeneities characterize many of the items 
typically offered for sale at charity events. At a local school auction, for example, differences in 
the perceived contribution of a particular son or daughter, sentimentality and aesthetic 
preferences may create very heterogeneous values among bidding parents for a collective class 
art project.
1   
                                                 
1 Value heterogeneities are not limited to local fund-raising events.  For example, Engers and McManus (2001) 
discuss several charity auctions, such as the wine auctions hosted by Hospices de Beaune, the Napa Valley Wine 
Auctions, and an auction of guitars conducted in 1999 by musician Eric Clapton.  More generally, items sold in 
charity fundraisers tend to be unique, nonstandard items for which a retail price is not well established.  Other 
frequently auctioned items include dancers’ shoes, the products of local artists and sporting memorabilia.  (See, e.g., 
Wyman (1990) pp. 77-79).  The possibility of a robust aftermarket may reduce the scope of value heterogeneities.  Second, we consider the effects of altering the fund raising format.  In natural contexts, 
the most standard selling formats at charity events include the lottery (or raffle) mentioned 
above, as well as an ascending price English auction.  In the lottery, participants buy tickets, each 
potentially giving the holder the right to win a prize.  At a pre-announced closing time, one of the 
tickets is drawn at random and the prize is awarded to the ticket-holder.  The English auction 
sales format is sometimes conducted orally with an auctioneer, and sometimes conducted as a 
“silent auction.”  Oral auctions most typically follow standard English auction rules, with an 
auctioneer soliciting ascending bids until a single bidder remains, who purchases the item at his 
or her final bid price.  In the silent auction bidders submit bids in writing for an item up to a pre-
announced closing time.  During the silent auction, a recorder monitors bids privately as they are 
submitted, and displays continuously and publicly the highest bid.  At the close of the auction, 
the highest bidder wins, and pays the bid price.
2   
Not only do the organizers or “hosts” of charity fund raising events vary these different 
selling formats across fund raising events, but hosts frequently vary selling formats across items 
at a single event.
3  Participants may purchase lottery tickets for an automobile, or a vacation 
package, for example, and then bid in a silent auction for other items.  We suspect that the issues 
of value heterogeneity and selling formats are interrelated.  In particular, fund raisers may base 
their choice of selling format for an item on the kind of participants they expect may bid for the 
item, as well as the likely distribution of values among bidders.   
Some theoretical studies have examined the effects of changing the sales format in 
charity events.  However, the existing literature focuses on the relationship between sealed bid 
auctions and a variety of “all-pay” auctions where the high bidder wins the auction, but all bids 
are paid.  Engers and McManus (2001) show that a first price all-pay auction generates higher 
revenues than a first price sealed bid auction. They further compare revenue predictions between 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, except for very big ticket items, transactions costs and financial constraints likely undermine the scope of 
after-markets frequently. 
2 As Isaac and Schneir (2003) observe, silent auctions also often involve the simultaneous sale of a variety of goods.  
These authors report that the simultaneous closing of bids for multiple items in silent auctions generates sizable 
revenue losses relative to auctions conducted one at a time.  A tendency for participants to “guard” or monitor most 
closely the items that they value most highly dampens bidding activity.   
3 Indeed charity fund-raisers do not limit themselves to the auction and lottery formats described here.  Interesting 
institutional fundraising variants include “Tumbola,” a lottery where each ticket entitles the holder to a randomly 
selected prize, an “R-auction” where the auctioneer auctions off portions of a lottery wheel, and a “cent lottery” 
where participants purchase multiple ticket packets, which they split and place into jars aside multiple items that are 
raffled simultaneously.  For a description of different fund-raising sales formats, see Nash (2000) or Wyman (1990).  
  2 the all-pay auction and the second-price sealed bid auctions.  (Predictions of the latter auction 
format are typically used to derive price and revenue predictions for English auctions.
4)  
Although Engers and McManus are unable to order unambiguously the revenue predictions for 
the two formats, they show that with enough bidders, the all-pay format generates higher 
revenues than the sealed bid auction.  Goeree and Turner (2001) generalize the analysis of 
charitable all-pay auctions.  They show that winner-pay auctions are poor revenue raisers, 
because the value of the highest-valued bidder sets an upper bound on revenues.  All-pay 
auctions can generate much higher revenues.  In particular, any k+1
th  price all-pay auction 
generates higher revenues than any k
th price all-pay auction.  Further, given a constant MPCR 
“h”, k
th price all-pay auction revenues become infinite whenever k <1/h.  
In addition to our focus on the lottery and English auction selling formats typical of 
naturally occurring charity fund raising events, we depart from the existing literature in that we 
assume public knowledge of value realizations.  In part, we make this assumption for analytical 
simplicity.  The publicity of value information simplifies particularly the analysis of the 
heterogeneous value lottery.  However, a very practical concern also justifies our assumption of 
publicly known values.  Although the “hosts” at local charity fund-raisers may not know the 
entire distribution of value draws for any auction the local charity may conduct, we doubt that 
the hosts view potential bidders as random draws from a distribution.  In particular, they 
probably can distinguish the items likely to attract only one or only a very small number of high-
value bidders from those items with much more homogeneous valuations, and may attempt to 
adjust the sales format correspondingly.
5 
Our lottery predictions follow from Hillman and Riley (1989) and Fang (2002), who use 
a rent-seeking context to motivate an analysis of lotteries in the case of heterogeneous, but 
                                                 
4 Engers and McManus are careful to observe that second price auction bid and revenue predictions match those of 
an English auction only for a special “button auction” variant of the English auction.  In the button auction, bidders 
indicate initial interest in an item by depressing a button.  Bidders release their buttons as an ascending bid clock 
raises bids above their reservation prices.  The bid clock stops and the auction ends when only one bidder remains.  
In a context where bids have no charitable component, Isaac, Salmon and Zillante (2002) show that “jump-bidding” 
or the possibility of increasing bids by more than the minimum increment may cause divergence in revenue 
predictions between second price and English auctions.  
5  One of the author’s personal experiences with a private school fundraising events supports this observation.  In a 
private school in a small University town, auction organizers base the sales format decision for collective class 
projects at least partly on whether or not one of the students’ parents in a class is a doctor.  
  3 publicly known values.
6  In this paper, we extend the analysis of heterogeneous, but publicly 
known values to the charity context and then we compare revenue predictions with the case of 
the known-values English auction.  We find that revenue predictions are importantly affected by 
the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public good, and by the distribution of values 
among bidders.  In particular, the English auction generates higher expected revenues than a 
lottery when the item for sale is sufficiently idiosyncratic (that is, only a very few bidders value 
the item highly), and when the return from the public good component is low (that is, the MPCR 
is low). 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 develops bid and revenue predictions for the silent 
auction and for lotteries in the case of known but heterogeneous values. Section 3 presents the 
experimental design and Section 4 discusses the experimental results.  A short Section 5 
concludes. 
2. A Simple Model of Silent Auction and Charity Auction Bidding.  
In what follows we first develop bid and revenue predictions for the English auction, and 
then we consider equilibrium bid and revenue predictions for the lottery.
7  We close with bid and 
revenue comparisons under the two institutions. 
Consider a situation where n agents, i = 1, …, n compete for an indivisible object or 
prize.  Each agent is endowed with a heterogeneous value for the item, Vi >0, which is common 
knowledge.  Without loss of generality, we rank order the values so that V1 ≥ V2 ≥ … ≥ Vn > 0.  
The proceeds from either sales format go toward a public good that benefits all agents equally.  
For simplicity assume that the marginal benefit from the public good, or the MPCR, is a constant 
equal to h, 0 < h < 1.  That is, each bidder i derives some positive utility h from each dollar 
contributions to the public good.   
                                                 
6 Fang shows that in the known but private value case, lotteries may have advantages over the all-pay auction 
formats.  In particular, he shows that given sufficient value heterogeneity, the lottery can raise higher revenues (e.g., 
cause more complete dissipation) than an all-pay auction.  Fang also shows that the “exclusion principle” shown to 
apply to all-pay auctions by Baye, Kovenock and  de Vries (1994) does not extend to the lottery. These results are 
interesting in that they differ somewhat from some conjectures by Goeree and Turner (2002) about the relationship 
between lotteries and all-pay auctions in the case where values are not known. Goeree and Turner argue that an all-
pay auction is essentially an efficient variant of a lottery and that removing the uncertainty about the winner will 
increase bids. 
7  Pooling the analysis of silent and oral versions of ascending bid auctions abstracts from some complications 
peculiar to the silent auction format.  As noted by Isaac and Schneir (2002), multiple silent auctions tend to be 
conducted simultaneously.  Also silent auctions typically have a fixed closing time, which may encourage deadline 
effects, such as pulling high bids at the last minute, or waiting until the last minute to submit bids.   In our 
experimental implementation of the English auction we abstract from these problems by auctioning off only one 
items at a time, and by injecting a “soft” closing rule where we extend bidding with the submission of late bids.  
  4  
2.1 The English Auction with Known Values and Charitable Intentions. Assume that each bidder 
optimizes a simple quasi-linear utility function, U   In an English auction, any bidder 
will remain in the bidding as long as the utility from winning the auction exceeds the utility from 
not winning. Consider the maximal bid for high-valued bidder 1.  If forced, bidder 1 will raise 
the bid to V
. i i i hb V + =
1: dropping out at b1 = V1-ε leaves bidder 1 without winning the auction, and with a 
utility U1 = h(V1 – ε)  from contributions to the public good (by the auction winner).  An above-
value bid b1 = V1+ε  lets bidder 1 win the auction, but at a loss: the bidder’s net utility would be 
U1 = hV1+ε(h – 1).  Bidder 1’s utility increases by reducing his or her bid to b1 = V1, generating 
utility U1 = hV1. 
Now consider the bid function for any bidder j other than bidder 1.  Knowing that bidder 
1 will remain in the auction until the bid equals V1, bidder j maximizes his or her return by 
bidding bj = V1 – ε, to earn utility Uj = hV1.  Thus, the equilibrium winning bid and revenue 
become V1.
8  
The static feature of this game bears emphasis. In a repeated context the highest valued 
bidder 1 could impose losses on low value bidders who are submitting bids above their private 
values.  Nevertheless, the effect of the charitable component on the equilibrium bid strategy in 
the English auction context merits emphasis.  Given public values, a positive MPCR (0 < h < 1) 
increases the equilibrium bid from V2 to V1.   The prediction is independent of the magnitude of h, 
provided that 0 < h < 1.  Further, additional increases in the public return affect neither bids nor 
revenues.  This result is our first conjecture: 
Conjecture 1:  Any positive MPCR = h, 0 < h < 1 shifts the bids and revenues for the 
public information English auction from V2 to V1.  Any further increase to an MPCR = h’ 
> h affects neither bids nor revenues. 
2.2 Lottery with Known Heterogeneous Values and Charitable Intentions.  Unlike the English 
auction, lottery participants pay their bids regardless of whether they win the prize or not.  Given 
heterogeneous values for the prize, a subset of n potential bidders may find non-participation 
                                                 
8 This result may be viewed as a special case of revenue predictions for the private value English auction.  Goeree 
and Turner (2002) show that in the case of private values and a positive MPCR, English auction revenues are bound 
by the expected value of the first and second order statistics from the value distribution, given n draws, E(V2
n) and 
E(V1
n).  Engers and McManus (2001) also anticipate our result. “Note how different strategies in the button auction 
would be if all valuations were common knowledge.  In this full information situation all bidders other than the one 
with the highest valuation would want to remain in the auction for as long as possible to inflate the payment that the 
winner makes to the charity. (p. 12)”  
  5 optimal.   Consider the bids of m bidders m < n, each of whom find participation optimal. Each 
participant i bids bi, to maximize expected utility  
) (
) (
) ( m hB b V
m B
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U E i i
i
i + − = ,   bi > 0     (1) 
where B(m) represents the sum of bids by all m agents, and 
) (m B
bi  is the probability of winning 
the lottery.  Optimizing (1) with respect to bi and taking as given the bids of all the other agents, 
yields the first order condition: 
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Summing over the m bidders, (3) yields an expression for the sum of bids or the total 
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Hillman and Riley (1989) characterize the Nash equilibrium for a lottery game with n players, as 
the largest subset of bidders 2<n*<n, each of whom submit strictly positive bids, and zero bids 
for bidders n*+1 to n.
9  This result extends in a straightforward way to the present case, since the 
addition of a linear public return from the lottery changes both individual values and B(m) by a 
factor 1/(1 – h).  Formally, define:   
} 1 ,..., 2 ), ( ) 1 ( : min{ 1 − = − ≤ = + n m m B h v m k m     (5) 
} , min{ * n k n =  
Then, Nash equilibrium bids are  
bi
* = bi(n*),  for i = 1, … , n*           (5a)  
bi
* =0, for i = n*+1, …., n. 
where bi(n
*) is defined in (3).  Lottery revenues are given by B(n*) in (4). 
                                                 
9  In his Theorem 1, Hemming Fang (2002) establishes uniqueness of the equilibrium characterized by Hillman and 
Riley (1989).  Fang’s proof contains some errors.  Using a different approach, Davis and Reilly (2003) establish the 
uniqueness result.  
  6 Prior to comparing predicted revenues across different fund raising formats, one feature 
of the lottery with a public return component merits comment.  Observe from (4) that the 
equilibrium revenue increases with h, the MPCR.  This becomes our second conjecture: 
Conjecture 2: Lottery revenues move directly with the MPCR. 
 
2.3 Revenue Comparisons.  The English auction yields higher equilibrium revenues than the 
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Notice that inequality (7) holds (and the English auction generates relatively more revenues than 
the lottery) (i) as h, the MPCR, becomes small, and (ii) as V1 becomes large relative to the other 
value draws.  We summarize these revenue comparison results as two final conjectures: 
Conjecture 3:  Given a positive MPCR, the ratio of lottery revenues to English auction 
revenues moves directly with the MPCR. 
 
Conjecture 4:  Given a positive MPCR, the ratio of Lottery revenues to English auction 
revenues moves inversely with the high value draw, V1. 
 
As a final comment prior to presenting the experimental design, observe that the revenue 
effects articulated in Conjectures 1 to 4 can be sizable if sellers play static Nash equilibrium 
strategies.  Table 1 illustrates English auction and lottery revenue predictions in the case of four 
agents with h = {0, 1/3, 2/3}, and for three mean preserving value realizations, L = {500, 500, 
500, 500}, M = {650, 500, 425, 425} and H = {800, 500, 350, 350}.  Looking at the English 
auction revenue predictions shown in the left portion of Table 1, observe that raising h above 
zero raises revenue predictions from V2 to V1, as stated in Conjecture 1.  Under the H set of value 
realizations, English auction revenues increase by 60% (from 500 to 800) as h increases from 0 
  7 to 1/3.  However the effect is confined to the first deviation of h above zero.  Doubling h from 
1/3 to 2/3 does not further affect English auction revenues.  
The grid in the left panel of Table 1 lists lottery revenue predictions.  As stated in 
Conjecture 2, lottery revenues move continuously with changes in h.  Holding constant the value 
sets, lottery revenues increase roughly 50% as h increases from 0 to 1/3, and then roughly double 
as h increases from 1/3 to 2/3. 
Consider finally, the comparative revenue effects summarized in Conjectures 3 and 4. 
Starting at the upper right corners of the English auction and Lottery grids in Table 1 observe 
that with the L value set and h = 2/3, predicted Lottery revenues more than double the predicted 
silent auction revenues (1125 cents vs. 500 cents).  Moving down and to the left observe that 
these differences fall and then reverse.  With the H value set, and h = 0, silent auction revenue 
predictions exceed lottery revenues by roughly 50% (500 cents vs. 335 cents).  
Examining predicted bids and earnings for the two sales formats lends insight into the 
factors driving the revenue predictions shown in Table 1.  Consider first bid and earning 
predictions for the English auction, summarized in Table 2(a).  For the M and H value sets, 
notice that raising h above zero raises the bid from the second highest value (V2) to the highest 
value (V1).  Notice also that as h increases, predicted earnings shift from zero for all bidders (for 
the L value set) or zero for all bidders but the high value bidder (for the M and H value sets) to 
positive and equal earnings for all bidders.  Finally, given h > 0, notice that increases in the 
MPCR  do not alter English auction bid predictions, but equilibrium payoffs for all bidders 
increase continuously.
10  
Table 2(b) summarizes bid and expected earnings predictions for the lotteries. Lottery 
bids are notably more heterogeneous than those predicted in the English auction.  Lottery 
participants submit identical bids only with the L (homogeneous) value set, and the high value 
bidder (V1) bids increasingly more relative to his or her rivals as the value heterogeneity 
increases.  Interestingly, however, in the lottery, higher bids do not necessarily translate into 
higher expected earnings.  Notice, for example, that with the H and M value sets and h = 2/3, the 
                                                 
10 In the public-value English auction with h > 0, the winning bidder realizes no surplus from winning the item, and 
thus the equilibrium earnings reflect the social welfare of the winning bid. This welfare would be reduced if the 
auctioned item came at a cost to the charity. 
  8 two low value bidders (V3) actually enjoy higher expected earnings than the high value (V1 ) and 
medium value (V2 ) bidders.
11 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures.   
To evaluate the behavioral relevance of Conjectures 1 to 4, we conduct the following 
experiment. The experiment consists of a series of thirty 24-period lottery and auction sessions.  
Our parameterization follows from the MPCR values {0, 1/3, 2/3} and the value sets {H, M and 
L} used to generate the predictions in Table 1.  In each session, a constant group of four bidders 
places lottery or auction bids under each of the value set combinations listed in Table 1.  To 
facilitate procedures and to give participants some familiarity with both the auction institution 
and the public return from bidding, we hold both the MPCR and the auction institution constant 
within sessions.  Thus, given two auction institutions and three MPCR values, the experiment 
consists of six treatment cells. 
Our primary interest is in the explanatory power of static Nash equilibrium predictions, 
when value realizations are not repeated extensively.  To this end, we rotate both value sets, and 
the assignment of values to participants across periods within each session.  Given four bidders 
and three value sets, we can, in a 12 period rotation, induce the high value draw (and the second 
high value draw) on each bidder once for each value set.  Our 24 period auction or lottery 
sequence consists of two realizations of this 12 period rotation.  To facilitate across-session 
comparisons, we repeat the same sequence of value set and value assignments each session. 
Appendix Table A1 enumerates the sequence of value assignments. 
 
3.1 Experimental Procedures: At the outset of each session, we randomly seat volunteers at 
visually isolated PCs, and an experiment monitor reads instructions aloud as participants follow 
along on a copy of their own. The instructions explain English auction or lottery bidding 
procedures, including how to submit and modify bids on their computer, the effects of the group 
investment, and the way earnings are calculated.  To assist ticket purchase decisions in the 
lottery, participants are given a ticket calculator.  With the calculator, participants can calculate 
                                                 
11 With h=2/3, lottery participants uniformly enjoy 2/3 of the sum of bids.  Expected earnings for the V1 and V2 value 
bidders are lower because the expected value of the prize is less than their optimal bid. Despite relatively low 
expected earnings, the predictions shown in Table 2(b) represent an equilibrium.  Bid reductions for the V1 or V2 
value bidders would reduce expected earnings for these bidders. 
  9 expected earnings per period given differing assumptions about their own ticket purchases and 
the sum of purchases by the other participants.
12  After answering any questions, the session 
begins.   
At the outset of each period, each participant is endowed with 800 laboratory cents, and 
the monitor announces and writes on a white board the value set for the period (the value 
assignments and individual bidders, however, are not linked).  In the English auctions, 
participants have 40 seconds to submit a bid.  To avoid deadline effects we implement a “soft-
stop” termination rule.  Any bid submitted in the final 15 seconds of an auction period 
automatically extends the period by an additional 15 seconds.  In the lotteries participants have 
90 seconds to purchase tickets.
13  In either sales format participants could submit bids or make 
ticket purchases in amounts up to and including their initial 800 cent endowment for the period.  
At the close of each period, a winner is identified, and each bidder’s endowment for the period is 
incremented by the private and public returns from the auction to determine period earnings.  
The computer program also maintains for each participant a running total of his or her 
cumulative earnings.   
This process is repeated 24 times, using the value schedule in Table A1 (this table is not 
distributed to participants). After period 24 the session ends, a monitor privately pays each 
participant the sum of his or her salient earnings, plus a $5 appearance fee, and then dismisses 
them.  We convert lab dollars into cash at the pre-announced rate of 2000 Lab Cents for US$1.
14  
Participants were 120 student volunteers, primarily undergraduates, from George Mason 
University during the Spring Semester, 2003.  Earnings for 45-60 minute sessions ranged from 
$11.50 to $29.75, and averaged $18.75 (including the $5 appearance fee).  
 
4. Experimental Results 
4.1 Overview.  The mean revenue paths shown in Figure 1 illustrate some of the primary 
experimental results.
15  Most prominently, observe that independent of the MPCR condition, 
                                                 
12 A calculator is unnecessary in the English auction, since participants see their potential public and private returns 
updated in real time, as they submit bids. 
13 The 90 second lottery period roughly equated the temporal length of the English auction and lottery periods.   
14 The conversion factor allows closer approximation of equilibrium bid predictions than would be possible with a 
penny grid in U.S. currency.  
15  In the panels of Figure 1 the sequence of realizations of each value set in a session comprise the horizontal scale.  
As Table A1 illustrates, our design rotates the different value sets in a roughly even order throughout the sessions.  
Thus, in each session participants face each value set eight times. 
  10 lottery revenues (thin gray lines) exceed persistently both English auction revenue (thin black 
lines) and static Nash predicted lottery revenues (thick dashed gray lines).  In contrast to the 
comparatively stable and near-Nash revenue outcomes in the English auctions, lottery revenue 
outcomes persistently exceed static Nash lottery predictions, often spectacularly, by margins of 
200-300%.  Lottery revenues approach English auction revenues only in the latter periods of the 
h = 0 treatments (when English auctions are predicted to raise substantially higher revenues).  
Lottery revenues in excess of Nash predictions have been observed previously in a charity lottery 
context (h > 0) with symmetrical bidders by Morgan and Sefton (2000), and in asymmetric rent-
seeking contexts (with h = 0) by Davis and Reilly (1998, 2000).  However, to the best of our 
knowledge, the immense surplus of lottery revenues over static Nash predictions observed here is 
unique. Apparently, the simultaneous presence of asymmetric bidders and a positive MPCR 
generates a strong interactive effect.  
Although the scale of excess lottery revenues dominates other effects, notice also that in 
the latter portion of the sessions, some predicted comparative static effects emerge.  Consider in 
particular the predicted and observed mean revenues for the English auctions, shown in the upper 
panels of Figure 2.  Observed revenues fail to follow predictions in the first session halves. 
Nevertheless, revenues for the H (‘•’), L (‘×’) and particularly the M (‘○’) value sets spread at 
least weakly in the predicted rank order in the second session halves.  Mean predicted and 
observed lottery revenues, shown in the lower panels of Figure 2, illustrate the predicted MPCR 
effect.  A weak relationship between lottery revenues and the MPCR in the first half gathers 
considerable strength in the second half.
16   
 
4.2 Revenue Effects. To evaluate quantitatively these observations, as well to evaluate formally 
Conjectures 1 to 4, we use a linear mixed-effects model to estimate revenues in the different 
sales format, value dispersion, and MPCR conditions.  Specifically, we estimate revenues in 
period t of session i (Rit) as 
                                                 
16  Comparing the upper and lower panels of Figure 2, notice that we double the vertical scale of the lotteries relative 
to the English auctions.  The doubling of the scale facilitates our highlighting both the comparatively subtle effects 
of increasing value dispersion in the English auctions, and the much more pronounced relationship between lottery 
revenues and the MPCR. Notice also in the lower panel of Figure 2 that even in the latter session halves, lottery 
revenues fail to consistently move inversely to value heterogeneity, as predicted.     
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where the fixed effects are defined as follows:  
ei = 1 if session i was an English Auction. 
ℓi = 1 if session i was a Lottery. 
hi = 1 if session i used h = .1/3 or 2/3. 
3 / 2
i h  = 1 if session i used h = 2/3. 
vt  = 1 if period t used the M or H Value sets. 
H
t v  =1 if period t used the H Value set. 
 
To control for interdependencies within sessions we define sessions as panels, and then assume a 
random effects error structure within panels.  Also, to control for serial correlation we assume a 
first order autoregressive process.  Thus, the sessions in (8) are modeled as random effects ξi ∼ 
N(0,σ
2
ξ).  We also accommodate non-spherical disturbances by  , |η it it it η ρε ε +
−1 +
                                                
it| < 1 and  
ηit∼N(0,σ
2ηt).   Finally, to gain insight into temporal effects, we divide the data into two twelve-
period halves, and conduct separate regressions on each half.
17  
Despite its length, equation (8) is easy to follow.  We model value set heterogeneity and 
MPCR interactions as marginal changes to a cumulative total, starting with h = 0 and the L value 
set in the English auction as the baseline revenue, βo.  The coefficients for each of the other 17 
terms estimate the marginal revenue effects of treatment changes that deviate in progressive 
increments from the baseline condition.  The first two rows consist of MCPR and Value set 
interactions for the English auctions.  The second two rows list a parallel set of interactions for 
the lotteries, as well as a lottery intercept term (when h = 0 with the L value set).  Modeling 
interactions as in (8) generates non-arbitrary estimates of each of the 18 treatment cells as a 
unique set of parameters.  Table 3 summarizes.  Notice in particular the bolded entries in Table 
 
17 The xtregar procedure in the STATA statistical package generates the estimates reported in Table 4. 
  12 3.  These entries highlight the marginal effects that distinguish each treatment cell.  Column (d) 
of Table 4 lists the predicted magnitude of these marginal effects given static Nash behavior. 
Columns (b) and (c) of Table 4 report the estimates.  In Table 4, as well as in the tables 
that follow, we evaluate both comparative static effects (e.g., coefficients that deviate from zero 
in the theoretically predicted direction) and conformance with equilibrium predictions.  The 
entries in parenthesis below each parameter report the probability that an estimate deviates 
significantly from zero in the direction predicted by static Nash behavior.  Bolded italicized and 
bolded upright entries highlight, respectively, instances where estimates deviate from zero at 
90% and 95% confidence levels.  Single and double asterisks printed aside entries indicate, 
respectively, 90% and 95% confidence levels that an estimate deviates from the predicted 
effect.
18  
The results in Table 4 reflect clearly some of the observations made previously.  Notice 
in particular the large and significant ℓ estimates, highlighted with a grayed box in row (1.1).  
These estimates are not bolded, as they deviate above, rather than below zero as predicted.  
However, as indicated by the asterisks, both the first-half estimate of 784.1 and the second-half 
estimate of 316.76 significantly and substantially exceed the static Nash prediction of –125.   
Notice also the ℓh and ℓh
2/3 coefficients, shown in rows (1.4) and (1.5) of Table 4.  These 
coefficients estimate the marginal effects of MPCR increases in lotteries.  In the first session half 
ℓh and ℓh
2/3 are relatively small and differ insignificantly from zero.  However, in the second 
session halves ℓh = 480.35 and ℓh
2/3 = 408.93, and both significantly exceed zero, as predicted, 
suggesting that with some repetition lottery revenues become sensitive to the MPCR.  
The marginal results in Table 4, however, reflect other observations incompletely.   
Notice in particular the ehv and ehv
H parameters reported in rows (0.6) and (0.7) of Table 4. 
These parameters estimate the marginal effects of increases in V1, the maximal value draw, on 
English auction revenues.  In contrast to predictions, the ehv and ehv
H parameter estimates not 
only fall below their predicted values of 150, but also the estimates do not differ significantly 
from zero in either the first or the second session halves.  The insignificance of the these 
estimates stands in apparent contrast to the mean revenue results for the second session halves 
shown in the upper right portion of Figure 2, particularly when h  = 1/3.  Unanticipated 
                                                 
18 Thus, the probabilities reported below the estimates reflect results of one-tailed tests, while the asterisks reporting 
the significance of deviations from Nash predictions reflect results of two tailed tests 
  13 interaction effects disguise the effects illustrated in Figure 2.  The ehv and ehv
H coefficients 
estimate only the cumulative marginal effects of increasing both value set heterogeneity and the 
MPCR (from h = 0 to h = 1/3).  Estimating the effect of value heterogeneity increases when h = 
.33 requires evaluation of the sums ev + ehv and ev
H + ehv
H.  As is evident from the ev and ev
H 
estimates shown in rows (0.2) and (0.3) of Table 4 these latter terms, which reflect some 
tendency for subjects to bid above Nash predictions when h  = 0, become relatively large 
quantitatively (albeit insignificant individually) in the second session halves.  
In fact, unanticipated interaction effects generally undermine a comprehensive evaluation 
of treatment effects from results reported in Table 4.  The lottery estimates contain some 
particularly notable examples.  Consider the parameters ℓhv, and ℓhv
H,
 shown in rows (1.6) and 
(1.7) of Table 4.  In the second session halves these parameters take on values of –287.68 and 
252.35 respectively, far different from their predicted levels of –6 and –15.  To evaluate the 
robustness of sales format, value set and MPCR treatment effects, we must account for the 
impacts of these unpredicted interaction effects.  Below we draw formal conclusions about 
experimental results that account for interaction effects by evaluating observed outcomes in light 
of predicted changes in the parameter combinations shown in Table 3.
19  
Consider first the effects of switching the sales format from an English auction to a 
lottery.  Establishing the robustness of the tendency for lottery revenues to exceed English 
auction revenues requires comparison of each lottery parameter combination shown in the lower 
portion of Table 3 with its English auction counterpart, shown in the upper portion of Table 3.  
Table 5(a) summarizes the predicted effects.  The left panel of Table 5(a) lists the resulting 
parameter differences, and the right panel of Table 5(a) prints the predicted values of these 
combinations, given static Nash equilibrium bidding.  Notice in the right panel of Table 5(a) that 
lottery revenues are certainly not predicted to exceed consistently English auction revenues.  
Indeed, five of the nine predicted differences are negative, and some of the differences are 
quantitatively quite large (the hv
H prediction, for example, is –298 cents).   
In an analysis comprised entirely of indicator variables, we can evaluate the significance 
of parameter restrictions by constructing new indicator variables as the sum of the indicator 
values for each of the combined parameters.  The estimated parameter value for the combined 
                                                 
19  The problem of accounting for interaction effects arises frequently in the analysis of experimental data.  We offer 
the rather lengthy analysis of the problem here as a suggested general approach.  
  14 variable recovers an estimate of the sum of the predicted parameter combinations shown in the 
left side of Table 5(a).  Table 5(b), which uses the same reporting format used in Table 4, 
summarizes the relevant estimates.
20  As is evident from the asterisks in each entry, the 
difference between Lottery and English auction revenues uniformly exceeds the predicted 
differences both in the first and in the second session halves.  Further, notice that lottery 
revenues uniformly exceed English auction revenues, often by quantitatively very large amounts.  
The dominance of lotteries over English auctions as a revenue-raising mechanism represents our 
first finding.  
Finding 1: Lottery revenues persistently exceed English auction revenues.  This result is 
robust to repetition, the MPCR level and the value set used.  
 
We turn now to the theoretical revenue predictions stated as Conjectures 1 to 4.   
Conjecture 1 is a comparative static claim about English auctions.  Specifically, given a positive 
MPCR, conjecture 1 posits that English auction revenues increase with V1, the highest induced 
value.  To evaluate this conjecture we restrict attention to the six English auctions treatment cells 
where h > 0 (e.g., the columns h = 1/3 and h = 2/3 in the upper portion of Table 3).  To calculate 
the predicted equilibrium differences associated with changing the value set, difference the 
entries within each column (MPCR level) across rows (value sets).  The left and right panels of 
Table 6(a) illustrate, respectively, the resulting relevant parameter combinations, and the 
predicted combination values.  Notice the predicted value of 150 in each cell in the right panel of 
Table 6(a).  These predictions reflect the predicted effects on total revenue of increasing V1 (from 
500 to 650, or from 650 to 800) when h = 1/3 (the left-hand column) and when h = 2/3 (the right-
hand column).  
Table 6(b) summarizes estimates of value set changes on English auction revenues.  In 
the first session half, summarized in the left panel of Table 6(b), observe that value set changes 
do not affect English auction revenues significantly.  However, turning to the panel on the right 
side, notice that with repetition bids spread consistently in the predicted direction, and that the 
differences are significant (at a 90% confidence level) when h = 1/3.  Importantly, the way that 
V1 increments affect English auction revenues is not entirely consistent with the underlying 
theory.  As mentioned in the introduction to this analysis, participants show some tendency to 
                                                 
20 The standard errors of estimates for the combined parameters provide the basis for the statistical comparisons 
made in Table 5(b).  
  15 bid above the predicted second highest value when h = 0.  Notice further, in the right panel of 
Table 6(b) that value set changes fail to increase English auction revenues significantly when h = 
2/3.  We have no definitive explanation as to why the effects of V1 increases appear to diminish 
as the MPCR increases from h = 1/3 to h = 2/3, and offer this result as a curiosity for further 
investigation.
21  In any case, we summarize the limited effects of value set increases on English 
auction revenues form a second finding. 
Finding 2: With repetition, and with h=1/3 revenues in full-information English auctions 
move directly with the highest induced value.  However, the effect is weaker than predicted, and 
in any case revenue-enhancing effects of increasing the highest induced value no longer remains 
significant when h=2/3. 
 
Consider next the lotteries. Conjecture 2 stipulates that lottery revenues move directly 
with the MPCR.  To evaluate this conjecture, we find, for each Value set, the lottery parameter 
combinations in Table 3 that survive changes in the MPCR, (e.g., difference the row entries in 
the lower portion of Table 3 across columns).  The left and right panels of Table 7(a) illustrate, 
respectively, parameter combinations and their predicted values.  Notice in the right panel of 
Table 7(a) that MPCR increases affect predicted revenues convexly: for each value set, the effect 
of increasing h from 1/3 to 2/3 more than doubles the effects of increasing h from 0 to 1/3. 
The observed effects of MPCR increases in lotteries, printed in Table 7(b) suggest that 
lottery participants respond to MPCR increases, and that the effect becomes more pronounced 
with repetition.  As seen in the left panel of Table 7(b), in the first session half, the relationship 
between MPCR changes and lottery revenues follows predictions imprecisely: increasing h from 
0 to 1/3 raises revenues in all value sets, and significantly so for the M and H sets.  However, 
further increasing h from 1/3 to 2/3 exerts no significant additional effect for inexperienced 
participants, despite a considerably larger predicted effect.  In the second session halves, 
summarized on the right side of Table 7(b) lottery revenues still increase by more than the 
                                                 
21 One possibility is that participants attend more closely to the relative earnings effects of a bidding decision than to 
the absolute earnings effects.  Although the absolute earnings consequences of raising a bid are independent of the 
MPCR, the percentage earnings increments fall with MPCR increases.  To see this, consider the earnings 
consequences of a bid of 600 for the high value bidder when V1 =800.  When  h=1/3, the V1 bidder earns (800 – 600) 
+ .33(600) = 400 from winning the auction, and .33(600) = 200 from losing.  When h=2/3, the V1 bidder earns (800 
– 600) + .67(600) =600 from winning the auction, and .67(600) = 400 from losing.  Although the earnings difference 
between winning and losing is 200 in either condition, the change represents a 50% increase over the return from 
losing when h=1/3, but only a 33% increase in earnings when h=2/3.  Indeed, the very high relative increase in 
earnings may explain why high value bidders respond to bids above 500, despite the fact that such bids leave lower 
valued rivals exposed to losses. When h=0, the V1 bidder earns (800 – 600) + 200 =400 from winning the auction, 
and .200 from losing, a 100% increase.  
  16 predicted amount for the increase in h from 0 to 1/3.  However, with repetition, the lotteries 
exhibit an increased sensitivity to the adjustment in h from 1/3 to 2/3.  Further, all the lottery 
revenue adjustments in the second half revenues significantly exceed zero, except for increasing 
h from 0 to 1/3 with the M value set.  In this case, the observed revenue increase of 192.67 nearly 
matches the predicted increase of 182.  However, sampling variability renders this difference 
insignificant.  We summarize these observations as a third finding.  
Finding 3.  Lottery revenues tend to move directly with the MPCR.  The effects of MPCR 
changes on revenues increase with repetition.  
 
Conjectures 3 and 4 evaluate the relative revenue effects of MPCR and value set changes 
in Lotteries and English auctions.  Conjecture 3 posits that given a positive MPCR, the ratio of 
Lottery revenues to English auction revenues moves directly with the MPCR.  Lottery and 
English auction revenue changes associated with the MPCR increases provide relevant evidence 
to evaluate this conjecture:  Conjecture 3 receives support to the extent that Lottery revenues 
increase more with a change in the MPCR than English auction revenues over the relevant range.  
In terms of the parameter combinations listed in Table 3, we evaluate whether the lottery 
parameter combinations that survive subtracting row entries across the columns h = 1/3 and h = 
2/3 significantly exceed the comparable English auction parameter combinations.  The left and 
right panels of Table 8(a) summarize, respectively the relevant combinations, as well as the 
differences predicted from equilibrium behavior.
22 
The observed relative effects of MPCR increases, summarized in Table 8(b), suggest that 
the predicted effects of increasing the MPCR emerge, but only with repetition.  In the first 
session half, MPCR  increases stimulated only relatively small and insignificant increases in 
lottery revenues over English auction revenues.  But with repetition, MPCR increases stimulated 
both substantially and significantly more lottery revenues than English auction revenues.  In each 
value set lottery revenues increased at least 395 cents more than English auction revenues, and 
the differences all exceed zero at a minimum 90% confidence level.  These observations form 
our fourth finding.  
Finding 4: With h > 0 the ratio of lottery revenues relative to English auction revenues 
moves directly with the MPCR. 
                                                 
22 Notice in the right side of Table 8(a) that the predicted differences equal the marginal effect of increasing h on 
lottery revenues, shown, for example, in the right side of Table 7(a).  Recall that given h > 0, additional h increases 
do not affect predicted English auction revenues. 
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Conjecture 4 evaluates the relative effects of value heterogeneity changes on the two 
sales formats.  Specifically the conjecture posits that given h > 0, the ratio of lottery revenues to 
English auction revenues moves inversely with value dispersion.  Evidence supports conjecture 4 
to the extent that English auction revenues increase more (or decrease less) than comparable 
Lottery revenues when the high value, V1, increases.  In terms of the parameter combinations 
shown in Table 3, we evaluate whether the English auction parameter combinations that survive 
differing relevant column entries (h = 1/3 and h
2/3 = 2/3 ) across rows (e.g, v less ~v, and v
H less 
v) significantly exceed the comparable parameter combinations in lotteries. As was the case for 
the other conjectures, Table 9(a) summarizes relevant parameter combinations and the predicted 
differences. 
Observed differences, summarized in Table 9(b) provide equivocal support for 
Conjecture 4.  Notice in the for the first session half, shown in the left panel of Table 9(b), that 
lottery revenues actually respond more than English auction revenues to the change from the L 
value set to the M value set (as indicated by the negative entries in the upper row).  However, for 
the change from the M to the H value set English auction revenues increase significantly more 
than Lottery revenues, as predicted, and the effect is significantly different from zero at a 95% 
confidence level when h = 1/3.  However, the effects of increasing V1 do not cleanly extend with 
repetition.  The relative effects of changing from the L to the M value set become positive in the 
second session half (and significantly so when h = 1/3).  However, repetition appears to diminish 
the effects of changing from the M to the H value set.  These inconclusive results form a fifth 
finding.  
Finding 5: The ratio of lottery revenues to English auction revenues do not consistently 
move inversely with increases in V1. 
 
4.3 Bidding.  Although we framed our theoretical analysis largely in terms of revenue effects, a 
consideration of bidding behavior provides some insight into experimental results.  The predicted 
and observed mean closing English auction bids and mean lottery bids, shown in Figure 3, 
suggest two features of bidding that drive much of the results summarized in Findings 1 to 5.
23  
First, neither closing English auction bids  (‘•’) nor Lottery bids (‘○’) track underlying English 
                                                 
23 “Closing bids” in the English auctions are the final bids submitted in a period by participants with a particular 
value draw.  Mean closing bids are closing bids averaged across period segments, and bidders with the value draw. 
  18 auction predictions (‘-+-’) or Lottery predictions (‘-−-‘) particularly well.  In the English 
auctions, bids tend to move with underlying values, contrary to predicted behavior in this full 
information game, and the effect does not appear to dissipate with repetition.  In the lotteries, all 
bidders persistently exceed static Nash lottery predictions.  Comparing lottery bids across the left 
and right columns of Figure 3, notice that unlike the English auctions, lottery bids show some 
tendency to decay in the direction of Nash predictions with repetition, as can be seen from 
comparing lottery bids across the left and right columns of the figure.  Nevertheless, even with 
repetition, overbidding persists in the lotteries.   
Second, notice the similarity of closing English auction and lottery bids, particularly in 
the first session halves, summarized in the left panels.  With repetition, the difference between 
closing English auction and lottery bids increases, as lottery participants adjust their bids 
downward.  However, the similarity of bids across sales formats in the first portion of sessions 
suggests why lottery revenues so spectacularly exceed English auction revenues.  At least in this 
four-bidder context, bids are similar across sales formats.  The similarity of lottery and English 
auction bids results in increased lottery revenues, because unlike the English auction, all lottery 
bids are paid.  
  To provide the quantitative support for the above observations regarding bidding 
behavior, we again use a linear mixed effects model to estimate differences in closing English 
auction and lottery bids.  Following the convention for identifying bid predictions used in Tables 
2(a) and 2(b), label the high, medium and low induced values as V1, V2 and V3, respectively.  
Then, for each MPCR level (h = 0, 1/3, 2/3) we estimate the bid by participant i in period t (Bidit) 
as.    
it i t i v v
t i v v i t v o it
v
v v Bid
ε ξ β β
β β β β
+ + + +










l l            (9) 
i= 1, …, 40, t = 1, …, 4, or 5,…,8 
where  
ℓi = 1 if participant i was in a Lottery session. 
1
t v  = 1  if participant i’s value draw in period t was 800 in the H set, or 650 in the M set 
2
t v  = 1 if participant i’s value draw in period t was 500. 
3
t v   = 1 if participant i’s value draw in period t was 350 in the H value set or 425 in the M 
value set.  
 
  19 We estimate bids in the H, M and L value sets separately.
24  Also, as with (8) we control 
for interdependencies within sessions, this time by defining individuals as panels, and then 
assume a random effects error structure within panels.  Also, to control for serial correlation we 
assume a first order autoregressive process.  Thus, in (9) ξi ∼ N(0,σ
2
ξ),  ε , |η it e it it η ρ +
−1 +
                                                
it| < 1 
and  ηit ∼ N(0,σ
2ηt).  Finally, to allow for insight into temporal effects, we divide the data into 
two twelve period halves, and conduct separate regressions on each half. 
The structure of equation (9) merits comment.  Using closing English auction bids for the 
bidder(s) with a value of 500 as the intercept, we estimate the marginal effects of each of the 
other realizations in the value set as well as the incremental effects of switching the sales format 
to a lottery at each value set.  To the extent that bids move with underlying values, the V1 
parameters (800 or 650) will be positive and the V3 parameters (350 or 425) will be negative.  To 
the extent lottery and English auction bids track each other, lottery bid estimates (e.g,. those 
appended with an ℓ) will parallel comparable English auction estimates.  
Regression results, printed in Tables 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c) illustrate both the persistent 
tendency for closing bids to follow values in the English auctions, and for English auction and 
Lottery bids to track each other.  Consider first the correlation between closing bids and values in 
the English auctions.  The shaded portions of Table 10(a) and 10(b) highlight the relevant 
evidence.  Were bids and underlying values uncorrelated (as predicted in the English auction) the 
coefficients on value deviations from 500 would differ insignificantly from zero.  Scanning down 
the shaded portion in left column of Tables 10(a) and 10(b), notice that in the first session halves, 
the null hypothesis is rejected at a minimum 90% confidence level in 7 of the 12 comparisons.  
Nor does the tendency for English auction bids to track underlying values diminish with 
repetition.  To the contrary, as shown in the shaded boxes on the right side of Tables 10(a) and 
10(b), the null hypothesis that bids are insensitive to value deviations is rejected in 10 of the 12 
comparisons. 
The hollow boxes in Tables 10(a) to 10(c) provide evidence pertinent to the correlation 
between closing English auction and lottery bids. If sellers follow static Nash bidding strategies, 
for every combination of MPCR and values, lottery bids should be much lower than closing 
English auction bids.  However scanning down the hollow boxes on left side of Tables 10(a) to 
10(c) observe that in the session halves, closing English auction bids and lottery bids are more 
 
24 Since values are homogenous, the regression for the L value set estimates only first two parameters in (9).  
  20 similar than they are different. We can reject the null hypothesis that lottery bids are not less than 
English auction bids at a minimum 90% confidence level in only 5 of the 21 combinations of 
MPCR and value.  With repetition, lottery and English auction bids separate to some extent.  
Nevertheless, separation remains incomplete.  As summarized in the hollow boxes shown in the 
right side of Tables 10(a) to 10(c), lottery bids are significantly below English auction bids in 10 
of the 21 combinations of MPCR and value. We summarize these observations as a final, sixth 
finding. 
Finding 6.  The similarity of bids across sales formats drives the observed excessive 
lottery revenues.  Contrary to predictions, closing bids in our full information English auctions 
move with underlying values.  Lottery bids track closing English auction bids closely, despite the 
fact that lottery bids are paid whether or not bidder wins the auction.  
 
5. Closing Comments. 
 
  Given the choice between lottery and English auction sales formats to raise charitable 
funds, our experimental results suggest that lotteries are clearly the preferred sales format.   
Lottery revenues uniformly dominate English auction revenues.  Further, an analysis of bids 
indicates that a failure of participants to adjust their bids for changes in the sales format drives 
the excess lottery revenues. 
Viewed in light of our results, the persistence of the English auction as a preferred 
fundraising sales format prompts some reflection on the relationship between our experimental 
environment and naturally occurring charity events.  Two potentially important differences come 
to mind.  First, naturally occurring charity raffles often have a large number of participants.  As 
the number of bidders becomes large, participants may come to adjust their bid for the sales 
format.
25  Second, in a fundraising context, bidders in oral English auctions may derive some 
considerable utility from demonstrating publicly their largess, and their determination to do 
whatever necessary to take home an item coveted by group members.
26  In future research we 
plan to evaluate these and other related issues.
27  
                                                 
25 Casual observation suggests that some adjustment must place.  Churches and school raffles for big ticket items, 
such as automobiles often include revenue caps, whereby total ticket sales are limited to a pre-announced fixed 
number.  Presumably such commitments would be unnecessary if bidders did not adjust ticket purchases for lottery 
sales format.  On the other hand, if overbidding in lotteries persists when the number of bidders is small, a charity 
sales format that sharply restricted the number of bidders might actually result in increased revenues.  
26  In their analysis of some naturally occurring charity auctions, Isaac and Schnier (2003) report some evidence of 
what they call “see and be seen” preferences as an explainer of jump-bidding activity in silent Charity auctions.  
  21 Issues other than the bidding environment may also explain the persistence of English 
auctions as a fund-raising sales format.  Importantly, lotteries and raffles are not always possible.  
Some religious organizations proscribe the use of lotteries or raffles as a type of gambling.
28  
Further, regulations regarding lotteries vary substantially across states and countries, and in 
many instances charity lotteries are effectively illegal.
29  Aside from legal restrictions, evidence 
from the fund raising trade literature suggests that the silent auction variant of the English 
auction is widely viewed as a pleasant, non-threatening event that provides the “social-glue” that 
allows fund-raising effects to occur in the first place.  The silent auction format creates a social 
context that draws in participants, and creates an audience for the high-revenue items, which may 
be raffled off, or sold at live auction.  To the extent that this latter explanation drives the survival 
of auctions as a sales format, our comparative static results suggest when the silent auctions may 
be least costly: Lottery revenues are highly sensitive to the MPCR, and at least guarded evidence 
suggests that English auction revenues increase with value heterogeneity.  Thus fundraisers may 
do well to use the silent auction format for items valued highly by particular individuals, perhaps 
at the beginning of an evening, when the case for the Charity has yet to be made. To the extent 
charitable intentions increase (and sobriety falls) as an event progresses, our results suggest that 
fundraisers may then find it wise raffle off big-ticket items toward the end of the evening.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Curiously, such preferences appear to be sensitive to the charity.  More aggressive bidding was observed in an 
auction held for a private preparatory school than was observed in a pair of church auctions. 
27 Relaxing our assumption that bidders have full information about the value draws represents an additional 
dimension of our experimental design that merits further investigation. However, although suppressing information 
about value draws may reduce English auction bids somewhat, we are skeptical that information about value draws 
drives the excessive lottery revenues. Looking at the mean revenues show in Figure 2, for example, notice that 
lottery revenues do not appear to be importantly affected by value set changes.  
28 The Baptist and United Methodist Churches appear to be the most uniform in their opposition to lotteries.  For 
explicit statements, see, for example, the United Methodist News Service Backgrounder on Gambling (revised 
10/02)  http://umns.umc.org/backgrounders/gambling.html, or Dr. Ray Prichart, Calvary Memorial Church: 
Gambling and the Christian Faith,  (1991, Keep Believing Ministries). 
http://www.cmcop.org/sermons/htm/issues/910725.htm  
29 For example, attorney Jed R. Mandel, advises fundraisers that most states proscribe as illegal gambling lotteries 
that are not run by the state.  Certain states and locals allow exceptions for not-for-profit organizations, and in other 
instances charitable organizations can often circumvent state restrictions by structuring their lottery appropriately. 
However, Mr. Mandel advises charitable organizations to get legal counsel prior to conducting a charity lottery. See 
Primedia Business Magazines and Media, Association Meetings (Feb. 1, 2003.) www.MeetingsNet.com. 
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English Auction  
  
Lottery 












L: {500, 500, 500, 500}  500  500  500    375  563  1125 
M: {650, 500, 425, 425}  500  650  650    364  546  1092 
H: {800, 500, 350, 350}  500  800  800    335  502  1004 
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Table 2(a) Bid and Earnings Predictions: English Auction (in cents)
* 
  h=0   h=1/3   h=2/3 
Value Set  Bid Earnings     Bid Earnings   Bid Earnings 
L               
V1 = 500  500  0    500  167    500  333 
V1 = 500  500  0    500  167    500  333 
V1 = 500  500  0    500  167    500  333 
V1 = 500  500  0    500  167    500  333 
               
M               
V1 = 650  500 150    650  217    650 433 
V2 = 500  499  0   649  217    649 433 
V3 = 425  499  0   649  217   649 433 
V3 = 425  499  0   649  217   649 433 
               
H               
V1 =  800  500 300    800  267    800 533 
V2 = 500  499  0    799  267    799  533 
V3 = 350  499  0    799  267    799  533 
V3 = 350  499  0    799  267    799  533 
 
Table 2(b) Bid and Expected Earnings Predictions: Lotteries (in cents)
  
  h=0   h=1/3   h=2/3 
Value Set Bid Expected 
Earnings  
 Bid Expected 
Earnings  
 Bid Expected 
Earnings 
L               
V1 = 500  94  31    141  172    282  594 
V1 = 500  94  31    141  172    282  594 
V1 = 500  94  31    141  172    282  594 
V1 = 500  94  31    141  172    282  594 
               
M               
V1 = 650  160 126    240  228    481 533 
V2 = 500  99  37    149  169    297  567 
V3 = 425  52  9    78  165    157  632 
V3 = 425  52  9    78  165    157  632 
               
H               
V1 =  800  195 271    292  341    584 551 
V2 = 500  111  55    166  167    332  503 
V3 = 350  15  1    22  161    44  641 
V3 = 350  15  1    22  161    44  641 
* Entries presume a minimum bid increment of 1 cent. Our theoretical development presumes a continuous bid grid, 
and that the minimum bid increment, ε>0. 
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Table 3. Parameter Combinations Yielding Revenues Estimates 
 
English Auction 
  ~h (h=0) h  (h = 1/3) h
2/3 (h = 2/3) 
~v (L)  βo  βo+eh  βo+eh+eh
2/3 
















  ~h (h=0) h  (h = 1/3) h
2/3 (h = 2/3) 
~v (L)  βo+ℓ  βo+ℓ+ℓh  βo+ℓ+ℓh+ℓh
2/3 
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Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  











547.04 503.31  500  0.1  βo  (0.00) (0.00)   
22.93 27.20  0  0.2  ev 
(0.37) (0.36)   
-3.92 59.74  0  0.3  ev
H 
(0.48) (0.40)   
10.13 4.41  0  0.4  eh  (0.48) (0.49)   
7.48 13.54  0  0.5   eh
2/3 
(0.48) (0.47)   
46.22 69.61  150  0.6  ehv  (0.23) (0.26)   
29.94 37.55  150  0.7  ehv
H 
(0.16) (0.18)   
-55.77 -46.81  0  0.8  eh
2/3v 
(0.29) (0.33)   
-55.70 -68.74  0  0.9  eh
2/3v
H  (0.30) (0.26)   
       
784.10
**  316.76
**  -125  1.1  ℓ 
(100.00)  (0.98)   
54.96
* 110.60
* -11  1.2  ℓv 
(0.22) (0.93)   
-144.59  -160.38
*  -29  1.3  ℓv
H 
(0.03) (0.02)   
161.46  480.35
*  188  1.4  ℓh 
(0.19)  (0.00)   
178.70
**  408.93  562  1.5  ℓh
2/3 
(0.17)  (0.01)   
147.81  -287.68
**  -6  1.6  ℓhv 
(0.93)  (0.00)   
-149.75
*  252.34
** -15  1.7  ℓhv
H 
(0.02)  (0.99)  
-177.36  203.06 -16  1.8  ℓh
2/3v 
(0.04)  (0.93)  
-28.59  -172.18  -44  1.9  ℓ h
2/3v
H 
(0.40)  (0.05)   
χ
2(18)  108.40 118.34   
ρ  0.24 0.14   
 
Ν  360 359   
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
* indicates deviations from predicted value at a minimum 90% confidence level.  
**indicates deviation from predicted value at a minimum 95% confidence level. 
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Table 5a.  Parameter Combinations that Evaluate the Difference Between Lottery Revenues 
and English Auction Revenues, and Predicted Values 




  ~h 
(h=0) 
h 
 (h = 1/3) 
h
67 





























































H(H)  -165  -298  204 
 







  ~h 
(0) 
h 
 (h= 1/3) 
h
2/3 














**  ~v (L)  (1.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 







**  v (M)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (0.00) 








H(H)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (0.00) 
v
H (H)  (0.87)  (1.00)  (0.00) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
* indicates deviations from predicted value at a minimum 90% confidence level.  
**indicates deviation from predicted value at a minimum 95% confidence level. 
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Table 6a. Parameter Combinations to Evaluate the Effects of Value Set Heterogeneity on 
English Auction Revenues, and Predicted Values 
   
Parameter Combinations 
    
Predicted Values 














v less ~v  
(M less L) 
  ev+ehv ev+ehv+eh
2/3v   v  less ~v  
(M less L) 
  150 150 
v
H less v 










H less v 
(H less M) 
  150 150 
 
 





















 69.15  13.38    96.81  50.00  v less ~v  
(M less L)   (0.18)  (0.43) 
v less ~v  
(M less L)   (0.10)  (0.25) 
 26.02  -29.68
**   97.29  28.55  v
H less v  
(H less M)    (0.35)  (0.37) 
v
H less v  
(H less M)    (0.10)  (0.35) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
* indicates deviations from predicted value at a minimum 90% confidence level.  
**indicates deviation from predicted value at a minimum 95% confidence level. 
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Table 7a. Parameter Combinations that Evaluate the Effects of Increasing the MPCR (h) on 
Lottery Revenues, and Predicted Values  
  
Parameter Combinations 
   
Predicted Values 
  h from ~h 
(1/3 from 0) 
h
2/3 from h  
(2/3 from 1/3) 
  h from ~h 
(1/3 from 0) 
h
2/3 from h  
(2/3 from 1/3) 
~v (L)  ℓh  ℓh
2/3 ~v  (L)  188 562 
v (M)  ℓh+ℓhv  ℓh
2/3+ℓh
2/3v v  (M)  182 546 
v








H  v1(H)  167 502 
 
  
Table 7b. Observed Effects of MPCR Changes on Lottery Revenues 
   
1
st Half     
2
nd Half 
  h from ~h 
(1/3 from 0) 
h
2/3 from h  
(2/3 from 1/3)    h from ~h 
(1/3 from 0) 
h
2/3 from h  
2/3 from 1/3) 
161.46 178.7
**  480.35* 408.93  ~v (L)  (0.39) (0.18)  ~v (L) 
(0.00) (0.00) 
309.27  1.34
** 192.67  612.59  v (M) 
(0.05)  (0.50)  v (M)  (0.12)  (0.00) 
304.11  29.93  445.01* 440.41  v
H (H) 




Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
* indicates deviations from predicted value at a minimum 90% confidence level.  
**indicates deviation from predicted value at a minimum 95% confidence level. 
  31  
Table 8a. Parameter Combinations that Evaluate the Effects of MPCR increases on 
Lottery Revenues Relative to English Auction Revenues, and Predicted Differences 
  Parameter Combinations    Predicted Difference 
  h
2/3 from h  
(2/3 from 1/3) 
  h
23/ from h  
(2/3 from 1/3) 
~v (L)  ℓh
2/3 
-eh
2/3  ~v (L)  562 





2/3v  v (M)  546 
v










H (H)  502 
 
Table 8b. Observed Effects of MPCR Increases on Lottery Revenues Relative 








2/3 from h  
(2/3 from 1/3) 
  h
2/3 from h  
(.2/3 from 1/3) 
168.57  395.39  ~v(L) 
  (0.51) 
~v(L) 
  (0.08) 
46.98*  645.86  v (M)  (0.85)  v (M) 
(0.00) 
131.27*  542.42  v




Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
* indicates deviations from predicted value at a minimum 90% confidence level.  
**indicates deviation from predicted value at a minimum 95% confidence level. 
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Table 9a.  Parameter Combinations that Evaluate the Effects of Increases in Value Set 
Heterogeneity on English Auction Revenues Relative to Lottery Revenues, and Predicted 
Differences. 
 Parameter  Combinations   Predicted  Differences 














v less ~v  
(M less L) 
  ev+ehv 





v less ~v  
(M less L) 
  167 183 
v
H less v 


















H less v 
(H less M) 
  194 238 
 
Table 9b. Observed Marginal Differences Between English Auction Revenues and Lottery 






















** -12.03   273.89  23.42  v less ~v 
(M less L) 
 
(0.91) (0.98) 
v less ~v 
(M less L)   (0.00)  (0.15) 
175.77  91.48   5.33*  108.77**  v
H less v 
(H less M) 
 
(0.05)  (0.42) 
v
H less v 
(H less M)   (0.48) (0.10) 
Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
* indicates deviations from predicted value at a minimum 90% confidence level.  
**indicates deviation from predicted value at a minimum 95% confidence level. 
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Table 10a. Bid Estimates – High Value Dispersion 
  First Half    Second Half 
Parameter 
(p)  
h = 0 h  = 1/3 h  =2/3   h = 0 h  = 1/3 h  =2/3 
o  380.97  461.33  516.76    443.90 448.40 435.54 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
v
3 (350)  -63.31  -85.09  -196.57    -226.75  -151.88  -95.71 
  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
v
1 (800)  132.89  164.31  -36.36    153.33  159.09  121.66 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.28)    (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
v
2ℓ  -117.31  -67.33  -113.56    -249.98  -77.81 6.85 
  (0.07)  (0.19)  (0.05)    (0.00)  (0.15) (0.46) 
v
3ℓ  -87.26  -85.09 -36.18    -84.80  -139.40  -43.20 
  (0.08)  (0.11) (0.24)    (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.25) 
v
1ℓ -5.37  -103.72  61.99  -297.88  -69.48 72.57 
 (0.47)  (0.09)  (0.18)   (0.00)  (0.17) (0.17) 
χ
2(6)  40.75  32.42  41.16    80.06 87.57 52.91 
  0.09  0.08  -0.01    0.25 0.11 0.13 
N  160  160  160    160 160 160 
β
ρ
Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
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Table 10b. Bid Estimates – Medium Value Dispersion 
  First Half    Second Half 
Parameter 
(p)  
h = 0 h  = .1/3 h  =2/3   h = 0 h  = 1/3 h  =2/3 
o  446.10  526.56  401.29    408.39 460.73 397.16 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
v
3 (425)  -182.55  -164.40  14.09    -151.03  -20.87  -72.85 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.38)    (0.00)  (0.21)  (0.10) 
v
1 (650)  69.40  31.32  156.86    125.04  114.92  167.69 
  (0.12)  (0.32)  (0.00)    (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
v
2ℓ  -39.20 -20.16 59.21    -177.70 -149.85  70.35 
 (0.29)  (0.39)  (0.18)    (0.00) (0.01) (0.18) 
v
3ℓ  18.27 6.35  -43.61    -47.29  -200.55  50.93 
 (0.38)  (0.45)  (0.20)    (0.17)  (0.00)  (0.20) 
v
1ℓ  -80.65 -78.12 -31.32    -241.21 -239.29  -40.53 
 (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.31)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) 
χ
2(6)  37.11  22.90  26.05    52.02 32.05 26.05 
  0.13  0.04  0.04    0.04 0.08 0.04 
N  160  160  160    160 160 160 
β
ρ
Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
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Table 10c. Bid Estimates – Low Value Dispersion 
  First Half    Second Half 
  h = 0 h  = 1/3 h  = 2/3    h = 0 h  = 1/3 h  = 2/3 
βo  430.23 402.96 430.52    276.75 380.68 381.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
v500ℓ  -74.08  -30.47 -14.84    -72.18  -58.54 44.15 
  (0.06)  (0.24) (0.36)    (0.09)  (0.11) (0.21) 
2(2)  2.60 0.49 0.09    1.81 1.55 0.60 
  0.18 0.05 0.11    0.05 -0.07 0.04 
N  160 160 160    160 160 160 
χ
ρ
Numbers in parentheses are p values giving the probability that the estimates could be that far from zero in the 
predicted direction when the true parameter value is zero.  
Bolded entries highlight instances where p < .05.  Bolded Italicized entries highlight instances where p < .10.  
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Table A1 Value Assignments (In Lab Dollars) 
   Bidder   
Period Value 
Set 
#1 #2 #3 #4 
1 H  350  350  500  800 
2  L  500 500 500 500 
3 M  425  650  500  425 
4  L  500 500 500 500 
5 H  800  500  350 350 
6 M  425  425  650  500 
7  L  500 500 500 500 
8 M  650  425  500  425 
9 H  350  500  800  350 
10 M  500  425 425 650 
11  L  500 500 500 500 
12 H  350  800  350  500 
13 M  425  500  425  650 
14 H  800  350  500  350 
15  L  500 500 500 500 
16 H  500  350  800  350 
17 M  500  650  425 425 
18  L  500 500 500 500 
19 M  425  425  650  500 
20  L  500 500 500 500 
21 H  500  350 350 800 
22  L  500 500 500 500 
23 H  350  800  350  500 
24 M  650  500  425 425 
 










H  Engl i sh M  Engl i sh L  Engl i sh
H  Lot t ery M  Lot t ery L  Lot t ery
d( ) l ih d( )
Sequence
Lab  $ Revenues,  h=0
Engl i sh aucti on  Pr edi cti on  ( M)






Lab  $ Re ve nue s ,   h=1 / 3
Engl i sh aucti on  Predi cti on  ( M)











Lab  $ Revenues,  h=  2/3
Lot t ery Predi cti on  ( M)
Engl i sh aucti on  Predi cti on  ( M)
Figure 1. English Auction and Lottery Revenues. Key: Each panel illustrates mean revenues 
for the 5 sessions in each MPCR condition (h = 0, 1/3, 2/3). English Auction and lottery 
observations are separated into sets of 8 sequences conducted under the H, M and L value 
dispersions.  For clarity English auction and lottery predictions are printed for only the M value 
set. 
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Engl i sh Auc t i ons
Lot t eries




H  Engl i sh
M  Engl i sh
L  Engl i sh
H  Pred
M  Pr ed
L  Pr ed
Lab  $
MP C R       h=0       h=1 / 3       h=2 / 3







H  Lot t ery
M  Lot t ery
L  Lot t ery
H  Pred
M  Pred
L  Pr ed
Lab  $
MP C R       h=0       h=  1/3        h=  2/3





MP C R       h=0       h=1 / 3        h=2 / 3








      h=0           h=1 / 3        h=  2/3 MP C R
Figure 2. Observed and Predicted Revenues by Session Half.  Key: Each Panel Plots Mean 
Revenues for the First or Second Half of Sessions in a Treatment against Static Nash Prediction.  
Within panels, markers identify revenues by MPCR (h = 0, 1/3, 2/3) and by Value Dispersion 
(H, M or L). 
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Engl i sh N. E.
Lot t ery N. E.
Va l ue
Lab  $
      h=0                                     h=1 / 3                           h=2 / 3
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Lot t ery Bi d
Engl i sh N. E.
Lot t ery N. E.
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Lab  $
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500 500 500 Va l ue
Lab  $
      h=0                                     h=1 / 3                           h=2 / 3






425 500 650 425 500 650 425 500 650
Lab  $
Va l ue
      h=0                                     h=1 / 3                           h=2 / 3






425 500 650 425 500 650 425 500 650
Engl i sh Bi d
Lot t ery Bi d
Engl i sh N. E.
Lot t ery N. E.
Va l ue
Lab  $
      h=0                                     h=1 / 3                            h=2 / 3






350 500 800 350 500 800 350 500 800
      h=0                                     h=1 / 3                           h=2 / 3
Va l ue
Lab  $
 Figure 3. Observed and Predicted Bids by Session Half.  Key: Each Panel Plots Mean 
Closing English Auction and Lottery Bids for the First or Second Half of Sessions in a Value 
Dispersion Condition.  Within panels, markers identify bids by MPCR (h = 0, 1/3, 2/3) and by 
Auction Type (English Auction or Lottery). 
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